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“Censorship always defeats it own purpose, for it creates in the
end the kind of society that is incapable of exercising real
discretion.”
— Henry Steele Commager, Historian
I. INTRODUCTION

The voting public justifiably takes for granted the ability to
freely gather information about election candidates. After all,
voters are flooded with information concerning candidates from all
sources, and have a plentiful supply of resources to research if they
feel they need more. This is certainly the case with elections
regarding the legislative and executive branches, but should it be
any different when the candidates are judges to the highest courts
in the state? The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reviewed
a Free Speech/Equal Protection case in which the plaintiff was a
judicial candidate for the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the
1
defendant was the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards. In
2
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, Greg Wersal, a Minneapolis
† Duke University, B.S. Mechanical Engineering 1994; William Mitchell
College of Law, J.D. anticipated May 2003.
1. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 854 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. Id.
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attorney running for the Minnesota Supreme Court, encountered
the provisions of Canon 5 of Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct.
The court considered whether that canon violated the free speech
and association guarantees inherent in the First Amendment and
3
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
4
court, inconsistently with a prior appellate decision, erroneously
ruled that such provisions do not violate the United States
5
Constitution.
6
This article first examines the facts of Kelly. It then explores
the history leading up to the American Bar Association’s current
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with a further look at the history
7
Next, the piece analyzes and
of Minnesota’s judicial code.
8
comments on the Eighth Circuit Court’s decision. Finally, the
article concludes that the court has ruled not only inconsistently
with prior appellate rulings, but also unfairly with regard to the
rights of judicial candidates, and more importantly, the rights of
9
the electorate.
II. THE FACTS
In 1996, Greg Wersal, a Minneapolis attorney and member of
the Republican Party of Minnesota, campaigned for the office of
10
The same
Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
year, the Minnesota Supreme Court revised the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct, reorganizing the individual canons to bring the
code essentially in line with the 1990 version of the ABA Model
11
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Of the revisions the Minnesota
12
Supreme Court made in revised Canon 5, one was to allow
3. Id. at 860.
4. See Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224, 231 (7th Cir.
1993).
5. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 885.
6. See infra, Part II.
7. See infra, Part III.
8. See infra, Part IV.
9. See infra, Part V.
10. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 857.
11. Id. at 857-58.
12. The text of Canon 5, A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Political
Activity Inappropriate to Judicial Office, is as follows:
A. In General.
Each justice of the supreme court and each court of appeals and district
court judge is deemed to hold a separate nonpartisan office. MINN STAT
§ 204B.06 Subd 6.
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(1) Except as authorized in Section 5B(1), a judge or a candidate for
election to judicial office shall not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; identify
themselves as members of a political organization, except as necessary to
vote in an election.
(b) publicly endorse or, except for the judge or candidate’s opponent,
publicly oppose another candidate for public office;
(c) make speeches on behalf of a political organization;
(d) attend political gatherings; or seek, accept or use endorsements from
a political organization; or
(e) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to or make a contribution to a
political organization or candidate, or purchase tickets for political party
dinners or other functions.
(2) A judge shall resign the judicial office on becoming a candidate
either in a primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office,
except that a judge may continue to hold judicial office while being a
candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitutional
convention, if the judge is otherwise permitted by law to do so.
(3) A candidate for a judicial office, including an incumbent judge:
(a) shall maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office and act in a
manner consistent with the integrity and independence of the judiciary,
and shall encourage family members to adhere to the same standards of
political conduct in support of the candidate as apply to the candidate;
(b) shall prohibit employees who serve at the pleasure of the candidate,
and shall discourage other employees and officials subject to the
candidate’s direction and control from doing on the candidate’s behalf
what the candidate is prohibited from doing under the Sections of this
Canon;
(c) except to the extent permitted by Section 5B(2), shall not authorize
or knowingly permit any other person to do for the candidate what the
candidate is prohibited from doing under the Sections of this Canon;
(d) shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his or
her views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his or her
identity, qualifications, present position or other fact, or those of the
opponent; and
(ii) by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice inappropriate to
judicial office.
(e) may respond to statements made during a campaign for judicial
office within the limitations of Section 5A(3)(d).
B. Judges and Candidates For Public Election.
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office may, except as
prohibited by law,
(a) speak to gatherings, other than political organization gatherings, on
his or her own behalf;
(b) appear in newspaper, television and other media advertisements
supporting his or her candidacy; and
(c) distribute pamphlets and other promotional campaign literature
supporting his or her candidacy.
(2) A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign
contributions or solicit publicly stated support. A candidate may,
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“candidates and judges to speak on their own behalf to gatherings
generally, while another prohibited candidates and incumbents
13
Wersal and his wife, Cheryl,
from attending political events.”
spoke at Republican Party gatherings during Wersal’s 1996
campaign, announcing Wersal’s membership in the Republican
Party and his support for a strict constructionist view of the
14
Constitution. Through distribution of campaign literature, they
also criticized several Minnesota Supreme Court decisions
15
concerning crime, welfare, and abortion. In May, a delegate to
the Republican district convention filed an ethics complaint against
16
Wersal with the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility. The
complaint questioned, among other things, Wersal’s presence at
Republican gatherings and the distribution of campaign literature

however, establish committees to conduct campaigns for the candidate
through media advertisements, brochures, mailings, candidate forums
and other means not prohibited by law. Such committees may solicit and
accept campaign contributions, manage the expenditure of funds for the
candidate’s campaign and obtain public statements of support for his or
her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting and
accepting campaign contributions and public support from lawyers, but
shall not seek, accept or use political organization endorsements. Such
committees shall not disclose to the candidate the identity of campaign
contributors nor shall the committee disclose to the candidate the
identity of those who were solicited for contribution or stated public
support and refused such solicitation. A candidate shall not use or
permit the use of campaign contributions for the private benefit of the
candidate or others.
C. Incumbent Judges. A judge shall not engage in any political activity
except (1) as authorized under any other Section of this Code, (2) on
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system or the
administration of justice, or (3) as expressly authorized by law.
D. Political Organization. For purposes of Canon 5 the term political
organization denotes a political party organization.
E. Applicability. Canon 1, Canon 2(A), and Canon 5 generally applies to
all incumbent judges and judicial candidates. A successful candidate,
whether or not an incumbent, is subject to judicial discipline for his or
her campaign conduct; an unsuccessful candidate who is a lawyer is
subject to lawyer discipline for his or her campaign conduct. A lawyer
who is a candidate for judicial office is subject to Rule 8.2 of the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2000).
13. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility investigates and
prosecutes ethical violations of attorney candidates for judicial office under the
direction of the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board.
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17

critical of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions. The Director of
the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board dismissed
the complaint, finding no disciplinary action was necessary under
18
Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Director’s written
determination noted several things. First, it was not clear whether
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 1996 revision of the Code retained
19
the ban on candidates speaking to political gatherings. Second,
20
the Director also questioned whether the “announce clause” was
even applicable to Wersal’s statements, or regardless of
applicability, whether it was enforceable, considering numerous
decisions from other jurisdictions striking down or narrowly
21
interpreting similar language. After receiving this notification,
22
Wersal withdrew his candidacy for the 1996 race. In January of
the following year, he announced his candidacy for an upcoming
23
1998 supreme court vacancy. The Minnesota Board on Judicial
Standards, in charge of enforcing ethical codes against judges and
aware of Wersal’s solicitation of the Republican Party endorsement,
petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court in September of 1997 to
24
amend Canon 5. The Board wanted to add language limiting the
ability of candidates to “identify themselves as members of a
political organization” as well as clarifying that “judicial candidates
25
could not speak to political gatherings.”
The supreme court
adopted these recommendations and ordered an amendment of

17. Id. The complaint also inquired into the solicitation of partisan support
by the campaign committee. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 858-859.
20. Id at 859. What is commonly referred to as the “announce clause” is the
phrase in Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) which states “a candidate for judicial office shall
not . . . announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues.”
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000).
21. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859.
22. Id.
23. Id. In 1998, Greg Wersal and Roger Peterson filed for the seat held by
justice Alan Page. Page and Peterson advanced to the general election.
1998-99
Annual
Reports,
at
Minnesota
State
Bar
Association,
http://www2.mnbar.org/reports/99annual.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2001).
Wersal also ran against Minnesota Supreme Court justice James Gilbert in 2000,
but lost 69% to 31%. Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2000 – Minnesota
at
General
Election,
Judicial
Results
(2000),
http://elections.sos.state.mn.us/ENR2000_General/ElecRslts.asp?M=J&P=A (last
modified Dec. 12, 2000).
24. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859.
25. Id.
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26

Canon 5, effective January 1, 1998.
In February 1998, Wersal sought an advisory opinion from the
Lawyers Board concerning whether he might be prosecuted for
ethical violations for speaking at a political party gathering or
obtaining a Republican Party endorsement, and also whether the
Board would enforce the Canon 5 provision that restricted
candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or
27
political issues. As for speaking at political party gatherings and
obtaining the Republican Party endorsement, the Director of the
Board stated that the Board would indeed subject Wersal to
28
discipline. However, because Wersal had not provided the Board
with specific statements he might make regarding his views on
disputed issues, the Board could not specifically advise him, adding
that, “the Board continued to have ‘significant doubts as to
whether or not [the announce clause] would survive a facial
challenge to its constitutionality’ and that it would not enforce the
provision unless the speech at issue violated other portions of the
29
judicial ethics code.”
Shortly after receiving this advisory opinion, Wersal filed a
30
complaint seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief from the
31
provisions of Canon 5.” The complaint asserted that Canon 5
violated the First Amendment’s free speech and association
guarantees and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
32
Clause. Wersal moved for a “temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Lawyers Board and Judicial
Board from enforcing Canon 5” so Wersal could participate in
33
Republican caucuses coming up in March 1998.
The district
34
court denied that motion and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The initial complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Other
plaintiffs who file suit involving the issue of First Amendment free speech and
association and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection in the context of relief
from the provisions of judicial codes have likewise file under section 1983. See
Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1228 (M.D.Ala.
2000); Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 696 (N.D.Ohio 1996); Stretton v.
Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 763 F. Supp. 128, 129 (E.D.Pa.
1991), vacated in part by 944 F.2d. 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
31. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 859.
32. Id. at 860.
33. Id.
34. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 996 F. Supp. 875, 880 (D.Minn.
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35

Circuit subsequently affirmed that decision. While awaiting the
appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Wersal canceled numerous speeches
scheduled at various Republican events and declined answering
specific questions asked of him by the press and public for fear that
answering might unveil his views on disputed legal or political
36
issues.
Pertaining to the prohibition of a candidate’s attending or
speaking at political gatherings, the district court found for the
37
defendants, concluding Minnesota had a “compelling interest in
maintaining the actual and apparent integrity and independence
38
of its judiciary” and that the bans on candidates’ political activity
and fund solicitation were narrowly tailored to serve those interests
because “[a]lternative means exist through which voters may obtain
39
information concerning judicial candidates.”
Concerning the
announce clause, the district court cited other jurisdictions that
found that “the state has a compelling interest in limiting the First
Amendment rights of judicial candidates in order to maintain the
actual and apparent impartiality and independence of the
40
judiciary.” The critical issue again for the court was whether that
provision was “narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in
maintaining the integrity and independence of the judiciary” and
interpreted the clause to reach only the candidate’s discussion of
41
issues “likely to come before the court.” The court likewise found the
42
announce clause did not unnecessarily restrict protected speech.

1998).
35. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, No. 98-1625, 1998 WL 764782, at
*1 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1998).
36. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 860.
37. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 986 (D. Minn.
1999). The primary defendant was Verna Kelly, Chairperson of the Minnesota
Board of Judicial Standards. Id.
38. Id. at 980.
39. Id. Presumably, Judge Davis is referring to Canon 5(B)(1)(c), in which
candidates may “distribute pamphlets and other promotional campaign literature
supporting his or her candidacy.” MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(B)(1)(c) (2000).
40. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
41. Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
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III. HISTORY
A. American Bar Association
The American Bar Association first devised ethical guidelines
for judges in 1924, with thirty-six “Canons of Judicial Ethics”
drafted by a committee headed by Chief Justice William Howard
43
Taft.
In terms of speech, Canon 28 provided that candidates
44
“should avoid making political speeches.” Judges were to avoid
giving speeches that advanced the cause of a particular party, but
were free to speak about current political issues as long as no
45
Similarly, Canon 30
obvious party connection was evident.
provided that a candidate for judicial office “should not announce
in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class
46
support.” While these canons were not intended to be a basis for
disciplinary action, the ABA replaced the original canons with a
new Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972 that was designed to
47
be enforceable. However, the range of acceptable political talk
was greatly curtailed by the introduction of wording in the new
Canon 7 that candidates could not announce their views on
48
“disputed political issues.”
Restrictions on discussion of legal
issues were also imposed, with judicial candidates prohibited from
49
announcing their views on “disputed legal issues.” The Special

43. THEODORE J. BOUTROS, JR. ET AL., STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY:
JUDGING THE JUDGES 121 (Roger Clegg & James. D. Miller eds., 1996).
44. PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 86 (1990); Canon 28 also required judges to avoid “making
or soliciting payments of assessments or contributions to party funds, the public
endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in party
conventions.” ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1924). After a 1933
amendment, Canon 28 prohibited judges from “generally engaging in partisan
activities and, more specifically, from serving as a party committee member or
party leader.” LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 45
(1992).
45. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924).
46. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 86. Further, a candidate for judicial position
“should do nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he
will administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.” ABA
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924).
47. BOUTROS, supra note 43, 121.
48. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 86. This provision is within Canon 7B(1)(c)
of the 1972 Code. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972).
49. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 86.
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Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct felt a judicial
candidate could not run a campaign based on a platform of
partiality for specific groups, nor could he commit himself in
advance of a judicial ruling on disputed legal issues, nor
50
The Committee further believed that
misrepresent himself.
candidates should not base campaigns on their views of disputed
political issues but should instead focus on their ability, experience
51
and record.
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
52
Responsibility began to revise the 1972 Code in 1986.
The
decision to revise Canon 7 of the 1972 Code stemmed from the
failure to provide sufficient guidance concerning the political
conduct of judges and candidates, principally because of the
53
various selection methods for judges throughout the jurisdictions.
What emerged from the Committee was a new Canon 5, addressing
four areas pertinent to both judicial candidates and sitting judges.
Canon 5A addressed issues common to the political conduct of
judges and judicial candidates regardless of method of judicial
selection, Canon 5B focused on issues unique to candidates subject
to appointment, Canon 5C to issues exclusive to sitting judges and
candidates subject to public elections, and finally Canon 5D dealt
54
with issues relating to the political activity of incumbent judges.
In August 1990 the ABA House of Delegates adopted these
revisions, including the addition of a preamble explaining the
55
function of the code.
As discussed above, Canon 5 of the 1990 Model code of
Judicial Conduct has four sections, of which section 5A concerns
rules related to free speech. Section 5A(3)(d) makes significant

50. E.WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 98
(1973).
51. Id.
52. BOUTROS, supra note 43, at 121.
53. MILORD, supra note 44, at 46-7. Methods cited include merit selection,
nonpartisan and partisan elections, executive or legislative appointments, and
court selection. Id.
54. MILORD, supra note 44, at 47. The Committee first attempted to draft a
Canon with three alternative sets of rules for the merit system, public elections,
and appointment of judges, however the Committee found this version too
repetitive. It then attempted a unified rule but was severely criticized for not
addressing issues unique to specific methods of judicial selection, including
concerns related to political speech in public elections. The final draft was a
hybrid of those earlier efforts. Id.
55. BOUTROS, supra note 43, at 122.
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modifications from Canon 7 of the 1972 Code. The prohibition
against a candidate announcing his or her views on disputed legal
or political issues was replaced with language that a candidate shall
not “make statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are
56
likely to come before the court.” The Committee thought this
wording would be more amenable to constitutional guarantees of
free speech, while still “preventing the harm that can come from
statements damaging the appearance of judicial integrity and
57
impartiality.” The Committee also believed the language in the
58
1972 Code could not “be practically applied in its literal terms.”
In terms of political gatherings, the original Canon 28 of the
1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics stated that “[the judge] should
avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting payment
assessments or contributions to party funds, the public
endorsement of candidates for political office and participation in
59
party conventions.”
The 1933 amendment added a second
paragraph to the effect that judges should not engage in partisan
60
activities. In 1950, the ABA added a final sentence to Canon 28:
Where however, it is necessary for judges to be nominated
and elected as candidates of a political party, nothing
herein contained shall prevent the judge from attending
or speaking at political gatherings, or from making
contributions to the campaign funds of the party that has
61
nominated him and seeks his election or re-election.
The 1972 revisions affirmed that thinking:
A judge holding an office filled by public election . . . or a
candidate for such office, may, only insofar as permitted
by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such
gatherings on his own behalf when he is a candidate for
election or re-election, identify himself as a member of a
political party, and contribute to a political party or
62
organization.

56. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990).
57. MILORD, supra note 44, at 50.
58. Id.
59. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1924).
60. MILORD, supra note 44, at 140. Specifically, “[h]e should neither accept
nor retain a place on a party committee nor act as a party leader, nor engage
generally in partisan activities.” Id.
61. ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS AMENDMENT TO Canon 28 (1950).
62. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(2) (1972).
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Of course, the “law” referenced above is established by either
statutory or common law of the jurisdiction of the particular
candidate since there is nothing within the Code itself suggesting
63
those parameters.
Section 5C(1) of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct
revised the 1972 Code, applying those provisions to judges and
judicial candidates in all types of judicial elections (partisan,
64
nonpartisan, and retention).
B. Minnesota
The methods of judicial selection in each jurisdiction are
65
varied and the canons or codes of judicial ethics of these states
63.
64.
65.

THODE, supra note 50, at 96-7.
MILORD, supra note 44, at 52.
For each state’s supreme court provisions, see LYLE WARRICK, JUDICIAL
SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (2nd ed. 1993).
Alabama: judicial selection and retention through partisan elections; Alaska:
selects judges through appointment by the governor, retention by nonpartisan
election; Arizona: selection through appointment, retention through nonpartisan
election; Arkansas: Both initial selection and retention are through nonpartisan
elections (updated information from American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection
Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2002); California: initial appointment by governor, retained at the next general
election after appointment by nonpartisan ballot, running unopposed; Colorado:
initial appointment by governor, retention upon proper filing of declaration and
majority vote at general election; Connecticut: nominated by the governor and
appointed by the general assembly; retention is by nomination for reappointment
and incumbent judges seeking reappointment to the same court are presumed
qualified with the burden of rebutting that presumption on the judicial selection
commission; Delaware: initial selection and retention through gubernatorial
appointment; District of Columbia: initial selection through nomination by the
President and consent by the Senate; retention through a filed declaration of
candidacy and review by the Tenure Commission; Florida: initial appointment by
the governor with a nonpartisan retention vote; Georgia: initial selection and
retention by nonpartisan election; Hawaii: initial selection by appointment of the
governor with retention through petition to the Judicial Selection Commission;
Idaho: initial selection and retention by nonpartisan election; Illinois: Initial
selection at general or judicial elections by partisan ballot, retention through
declaration of candidacy and nonpartisan election; Indiana: initial selection by
governor appointment, retention by general election; Iowa: initial selection by
governor appointment with a retention ballot at the next judicial election; Kansas:
initial selection through nonpartisan appointment by the governor, retention by
election on a nonpartisan ballot; Kentucky: initial selection and retention by
nonpartisan election; Louisiana: initial selection and retention through partisan
elections; Maine: initial selection and retention through gubernatorial
appointment subject to review by the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary;
Maryland: initial selection through appointment by the governor with an
uncontested retention election; Massachusetts: initial selection through
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nomination and appointment by the governor, retention not applicable due to the
nature of the judges’ terms; Michigan: initial selection and retention through
partisan elections (updated information from American Judicature Society,
Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2002). While party affiliations are not listed on the ballots
candidates usually run with party endorsements. Id.; Minnesota: initial selection
and retention using nonpartisan elections; Mississippi: initial selection and
retention through partisan elections; Missouri: initial selection through
appointment by the governor, retention through separate nonpartisan judicial
ballot; Montana: initial selection by nonpartisan election, retention through
reelection either against an opponent or solely on the question of retention or
rejection; Nebraska: initial selection by the governor, retention through
nonpartisan uncontested ballot; Nevada: initial selection and retention through
nonpartisan election; New Hampshire: initial selection through nomination, with
all judicial officers serving during good behavior until mandatory retirement at
seventy; New Jersey: initial selection through appointment by the governor,
retention through reappointment; New Mexico: initial selection through
appointment by the governor, first retention election on a partisan ballot,
subsequent retention elections by nonpartisan ballot; New York: initial selection
and retention through appointment by the governor; North Carolina: initial
selection and retention through partisan elections; North Dakota: initial selection
and retention through nonpartisan elections; Ohio: initial selection and retention
through partisan elections(updated information from American Judicature
Society, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html
(last visited Jan. 31, 2002). As in Michigan, party affiliation is not listed on the
ballot. Id.; Oklahoma: initial selection by appointment, retention through a
uncontested nonpartisan ballot; Oregon: initial selection and retention through
nonpartisan elections; Pennsylvania: initial selection by partisan election,
retention through nonpartisan election; Rhode Island: initial selection by both
legislative houses in grand committee, retention is for life based on good behavior;
South Carolina: initial selection and retention by “joint public vote of the general
assembly, from a list of nominees supplied by the judicial screening committee”;
South Dakota: initial selection by gubernatorial appointment, retention through
submittal to the electorate (no competitive elections); Tennessee: merit selection
through nominating commission for appellate level, partisan elections on district
level, retention through nonpartisan election (updated information from
American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at
http://www.ajs.org/select11.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2002); Texas: initial
selection and retention by partisan election; Utah: initial selection through
appointment by the governor, retention through an unopposed retention
election; Vermont: initial selection by gubernatorial appointment, continuation in
office unless voted out by the members of the general assembly; Virginia: initial
selection and retention by “majority vote of both houses of the general assembly;”
Washington: initial selection and retention through nonpartisan election; West
Virginia: initial selection and retention through partisan elections; Wisconsin:
initial selection and retention by nonpartisan election; Wyoming: initial selection
through appointment by the governor, retention by nonpartisan uncontested
judicial ballot. Thus, the majority of states (twenty-one, including D.C.) use some
form of gubernatorial appointments, nine states have partisan elections, twelve
utilize nonpartisan elections, and nine combine methods. American Judicature
Society, Judicial Selection Methods in the States, at http://www.ajs.org/select11.html
(last visited Jan. 31, 2002).
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and political

66. The following is a listing of all state Canons or Codes of Judicial Ethics
and their treatment of candidates’ abilities to discuss their views on legal or
political issues: ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2001)
(stating that a candidate for office by either public election or on the basis of the
merit system shall not announce in advance his or her conclusions of law on
pending litigation). The commentary to Canon 7(B) mentions that candidates
may appear and speak on their own behalf at any function organized in support of
his or her candidacy. Canon 7(B) cmt.; ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (“A candidate for judicial office shall not make statements
that commit or appear to commit the candidate to a particular view or decision
with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court . . . .”). This wording is identical to the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct; Canon 5(B)(1)(d)(ii) (2001); ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(echoing the “commit or appear to commit . . . likely to come before the court”
language of the 1990 ABA Code); ARKANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (using the familiar “commit” language); CALIFORNIA CODE
OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(B) (2001) (stating a “candidate for election or
appointment to judicial office shall not make statements to the electorate or the
appointing authority that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect
to cases, controversies, or issues that could come before the courts”); COLORADO
RULES OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2000) (stating that a judge who is
a candidate for retention should not “announce how the judge would rule on any
case or issue that might come before the judge.”); Canon 7(C)(1) (“A judge may
attend and participate in nonpartisan gatherings at which legal or social issues are
addressed, provided that the judge shall neither discuss cases in which he or she
has participated that are not yet final, nor state how the judge would rule on any
case or issue that might come before him or her.”); The CONNECTICUT CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2000) does not have any provisions concerning statements
regarding legal or political issues within its appellate court system; The DELAWARE
JUDGES’ CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to the issue of legal or
political speech, likely due to the lack of judicial elections; FLORIDA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C)(3) (2001) (stating that a judicial candidate
involved in election or re-election should avoid “expressing a position on any
political issue” or any “affiliation with any political party” when attending and
speaking at a political party function); GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7(B)(1)(c) (2001) (sustaining the identical “commit or appear to commit”
language of the 1990 ABA Model Code); The HAWAII CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(2001) does not specifically refer to matters of expression of political views; The
IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically refer to matters of
expression of political views; ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 67 Canon
7(A)(3)(d)(i) (2001) (expressing the ABA Model Code’s “commit” language);
INDIANA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (reaffirming the
ABA “commit” verbiage); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (“A
judge who is a candidate for retention in judicial office . . . [s]hould not . . .
announce views on disputed legal or political issues”); KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 16-813 Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (restating the ABA 1990 Model
Code “commit” language); KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(B)(1)(c) (1999) (echoing the ABA’s “commit” language); LOUISIANA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d)(ii) (2001) (reaffirming the 1990 ABA Code
language); MAINE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1)(b) (2000) (stating
the 1990 ABA Code “commit” language for candidates seeking appointment to
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judicial office); MARYLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(5) (2001) (“A
judge who is a candidate for election, re-election, or retention to judicial office
may engage in partisan political activity allowed by law with respect to such
candidacy, except that the judge . . . should not . . . announce the judge’s views on
disputed legal or political issues . . . .”); The MASSACHUSETTS CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically refer to matters of expression of political
views; The MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically refer
to matters of expression of political views; MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000) (stating that a candidate shall not “announce his or
her views on disputed legal or political issues”); MISSISSIPPI CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2001) (declaring that candidates should not
announce their views on “disputed legal or political issues.”). It is interesting to
note that notwithstanding Canon 7’s “announce clause.” Candidates may attend
political gatherings, speak to those gatherings on their own behalf, identify
themselves as members of a political party and contribute to political parties.
Canon 7(A)(2); MISSOURI CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1)(c) (2001)
(stating that candidates shall not announce views on disputed legal issues). Unlike
other “announce clause” provisions, Missouri’s prohibits announcing views on
legal issues, but does not reference political issues. Id.; MONTANA CANONS OF
available
at
JUDICIAL
ETHICS
Canon
30
(1963),
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/View/Collection-2931 (last visited
Oct. 22, 2001) (restating the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics language that the
candidate “should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed
issues to secure class support”); NEBRASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (repeating the 1990 ABA Code “commit” language for
candidates seeking appointment to judicial office); NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (restating the ABA 1990 Model Code
“commit” language); The NEW HAMPSHIRE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does
not refer to judicial candidates due to New Hampshire’s method of judicial
selection; The NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to
judicial candidates due to New Jersey’s method of judicial selection; NEW MEXICO
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 21-700(B)(4) (2000) (stating that candidates for
judicial election shall not make statements that commit or appear to “commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
before the court” nor “announce how the candidate would rule on any case or
issue that may come before the court”); NEW YORK CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A)(4)(d)(ii) (2001) (restating the ABA’s 1990 “commit” language); The
NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not contain a specific
provision limiting a candidate’s ability to discuss legal or political issues or issues
likely to come before the court; NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (repeating the 1990 ABA Model Code “commit” provision);
OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2)(d) (2001) (stating the familiar
“commit or appear to commit” language of the ABA Code); OKLAHOMA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (restating the ABA Code
“commit” expression); The OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1999) does not
specifically limit candidates’ speech concerning legal or political issues;
PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2001) (stating that a
candidate should not “announce his views on disputed legal or political issues”);
RHODE ISLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (using the
ABA Code’s “commit or appear to commit” language); SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (restating the “commit” provision
of the ABA Code); SOUTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss4/3

14

Nelson: Don't Rock the Boat: Minnesota's Canon 5 Keeps Incumbents High an
09_NELSON

2002]

4/22/2002 10:24 AM

DON’T ROCK THE BOAT: MINNESOTA’S CANON 5

gathering provisions.

67

1621

States may freely modify or reject any or all

5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (reaffirming the ABA Code’s “commit or appear to
commit” language); TENNESSEE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii)
(2001) (using the ABA “commit or appear to commit” verbiage); TEXAS CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(1) (2001) (“A judge or judicial candidate shall not
make statements that indicate an opinion on any issue that may be subject to
judicial interpretation by the office which is being sought or held, except that
discussion of an individual’s judicial philosophy is appropriate if conducted in a
manner which does not suggest to a reasonable person a probable decision on any
particular case.”). Likewise, a “judge or judicial candidate may . . . express his or
her views on political matters.” Canon 5(3); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(B)(4) (2000) (stating that candidates who have been confirmed by the
senate shall not “take a public position on a non-partisan political issue which
would jeopardize the confidence of the public in the impartiality of the judicial
system.”). Utah’s Code also contains a blanket statement directing candidates for
selection by the judicial nominating commission not to “engage in political
activities that would jeopardize the confidence of the public or of governmental
officials in the political impartiality of the judicial branch of government” Canon
5(A); VERMONT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(4)(b) (2000) (restating
the familiar ABA language of making statements that “commit or appear to
commit” them to issues “likely to come before the court); The CANONS OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT FOR THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, (2000) do not stipulate provisions for
candidates announcing views on legal or political issues due to Virginia’s method
CONDUCT Canon
of judicial selection; WASHINGTON CODE OF JUDICIAL
5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (using the ABA Code’s “commit” language); WEST VIRGINIA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2001) (reaffirming the ABA
Code “commit or appear to commit” language); The WISCONSIN CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, R. 60.06(3) (2001) does not presently specifically mention a limit on a
non-incumbent candidate’s ability to announce his or her views on legal or
political issues, but does prohibit a judge from doing anything that “would commit
the judge or appear to commit the judge in advance with respect to any particular
case or controversy or which suggests that, if elected or chosen, the judge would
administer his or her office with partiality, bias or favor.”; WYOMING CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000) (using the “commit or appear to
commit” language of the 1990 ABA Model Code).
67. The following is a listing of all state Canons or Codes of Judicial Ethics
and their treatment of candidates’ abilities concerning attendance and/or speech
at political gatherings: ALABAMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(A)(1)
(2001). This provision explains in pertinent part that
so long as judges are subject to nomination and election as candidates of
a political party, it is realized that a judge or a candidate for election to a
judicial office cannot divorce himself or herself completely from political
organizations and campaign activities which, indirectly or directly, may
be involved in his or her election or re-election. Nevertheless, should a
judge or a candidate for a judicial position be directly or indirectly
involved in the internal workings or campaign activities of a political
organization, it is imperative that he or she at all times conduct himself
or herself in such a manner as to prevent any political considerations,
entanglements, or influences from ever becoming involved in or from
ever appearing to be involved in any judicial decision or in the judicial
process.
Id.; ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (requiring all
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judges and candidates for appointment to judicial office not attend political
gatherings unless he or she is a non-judge candidate); ARIZONA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (“A judge or a candidate for election to
judicial office shall not actively take part in any political campaign other than his
or her own election, reelection or retention in office”); Canon 5(A)(2) (“A judge
or a non-judge who is a candidate for judicial office may speak to political
gatherings on his or her own behalf.”); ARKANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (judges and candidates shall not attend political
gatherings unless a non-judge candidate for appointment to judicial office or a
candidate subject to public election. A judge or candidate subject to public
election may identify himself or herself as a political party member and when a
candidate speak to gatherings on his or her own behalf); CALIFORNIA CODE OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5(C) (2001) (“Candidates for judicial office may speak at
political gatherings only on their behalf or on behalf of another candidate for
judicial office.”); COLORADO RULES OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE Canon 7(B)(2) (2000)
(declaring that a judicial candidate for retention in office should abstain from
campaign activity in connection with his or her own candidacy unless there is
active opposition to that judge’s retention in office, in which case the candidate
may request the organization of a nonpartisan committee advocating his or her
retention); Canon 7(C) (stating that the judge may “attend and participate in
nonpartisan gatherings at which legal or social issues are addressed.”);
CONNECTICUT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(a)(3) (2000) (declaring that a
judge should not attend political gatherings (because Connecticut does not have
judicial elections. WARRICK, supra note 65.)); The DELAWARE JUDGES’ CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to the issue of candidates attending
political gatherings, likely due to the lack of judicial elections; FLORIDA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(A)(1)(d) (2001) (declaring a judge or candidate
shall not attend political party functions unless a non-judge candidate for
appointment to judicial office or unless involved in election or re-election.
However, any invitation to speak at a political party function must include all other
candidates for that office and the candidate should not comment on his or her
affiliation with that political party. Also, any candidate attending a political party
function “must avoid conduct that suggests or appears to suggest support or
opposition to a political party, a political issue, or another candidate”); GEORGIA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001) (“Judges holding an office filled
by public election between competing candidates, or candidates for such office,
may attend political gatherings and speak to such gatherings on their own behalf
when they are candidates for election or re-election.”); HAWAII CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (stating that a judge or candidate shall not
attend political gatherings). The commentary further mentions that those judges
and candidates retain the right to “participate in the political process as a voter.”
Canon 5(A)(1)(2001) cmt.; The IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)
(2001) does not specifically disallow attendance or speech at political events, but
retains the 1990 ABA Model Code’s prohibition on making speeches for political
organizations (the ABA Code does, however, allow this practice in certain
circumstances for candidates subject to public election, ABA MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A)(1)(c) (1990); ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 67 Canon 7(B)(1)(a)(i),(ii) (2001) (“A judge or candidate may . . . attend
political gatherings; identify himself or herself as a member of a political party;”);
Canon 7(B)(1)(b)(i) (2001) (stating that when a candidate for public election, he
or she may “speak to gatherings on his or her own behalf”;) INDIANA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001) (directing that candidates shall not
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attend gatherings of political organizations unless a candidate subject to public
election); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1)(c) (2001) (stating that
judges should not attend political gatherings (no provision concerning political
gatherings directly applies to candidates)); KANSAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (directing that candidates may attend political gatherings
unless a nonjudge candidate for appointment to judicial office or subject to public
election (in which case the candidate may permit his or her name to be “listed on
election materials.”); KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(2) (1999)
(stating that a judge or a candidate for election may purchase tickets to and attend
political gatherings and may speak to such gatherings on the candidate’s own
behalf, however, a candidate cannot identify himself or herself as a member of a
political party when speaking to a gathering. If not initiated by the candidate for
such office, and only in answer to a direct question, the judge or candidate may
identify himself or herself as a member of a particular political party); LOUISIANA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(C) (2001) (stating that judicial candidates
may at any time attend political gatherings, identify themselves as members of
political parties and speak to gatherings on their own behalf); MAINE CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (declaring that incumbent judges
shall not attend political gatherings (no comparable provision exists for
candidates seeking appointment)); MARYLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(B) (2001) (declaring that judges who are candidates for election, re-election, or
retention to judicial office are allowed to engage in partisan political activities (no
condition, therefore, details attendance at political gatherings)); MASSACHUSETTS
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1)(c) (2001) (affirming that a judge
should not attend political gatherings (the lack of candidate provisions is expected
given Massachusetts’ judicial selection process, see supra note 65)); MICHIGAN CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001) (stating that a judge or candidate
may both attend political gatherings and speak to those gatherings); MINNESOTA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (declaring that candidates
shall not attend political gatherings); MISSISSIPPI CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7(A)(1)(c) (2001) (affirming a candidate should not attend political
gatherings unless a candidate for office filled by public election); MISSOURI CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(2) (2001) (“Where it is necessary that a judge
be nominated and elected as a candidate of a political party, an incumbent judge
or candidate for election to judicial office may attend or speak on the judge or
candidate’s own behalf at political gatherings . . . .”); MONTANA CANONS OF
available
at
JUDICIAL
ETHICS
Canon
28
(1963)
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/View/Collection-2931 (last visited
Oct. 22, 2001) (restating the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics language that the
candidate “should avoid making political speeches . . . and participation in party
conventions.”); NEBRASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000)
(stating that candidates shall not attend political gatherings unless a “non-judge
candidate for appointment to judicial office” or a candidate subject to retention
election); NEVADA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(1)(a)(i) (2001)
(declaring that candidates subject to public election may attend political
gatherings). The 2000 amendment to this canon permits candidates to identify
their political party membership upon request but cannot align themselves with
political parties. Canon 5(C)(1) cmt.; The NEW HAMPSHIRE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2001) does not refer to judicial candidates due to New Hampshire’s
method of judicial selection; The NEW JERSEY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001)
does not refer to judicial candidates due to New Jersey’s method of judicial
selection (although judges are not to “attend political functions that are likely to
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be considered as being political in nature). Canon 7(A)(3); NEW MEXICO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 21-700(B) (2000) (“Candidates for election to judicial office
in partisan, nonpartisan and retention elections, including judges, lawyers and
non-lawyers, are permitted to participate in the electoral process . . . [all
candidates] may speak at public meetings,” but in a nonpartisan election may not
use advertising containing any reference to his or her affiliation with a political
party). Incumbent judges may attend political gatherings and identify themselves
as members of political parties. R. 21-700(A)(2); NEW YORK CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(g) (2001) (reaffirming a candidate for election to
judicial office shall not “directly or indirectly engage in any political activity”
including attending political gatherings). Of course, a judge or non-judge who is
a candidate for a judicial office via public election may “purchase two tickets to,
and attend, politically sponsored dinners and other functions.”
Canon
5(A)(2)(v); NORTH CAROLINA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001)
(“A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing
candidates, or a candidate for such office, may attend political gatherings, speak to
such gatherings, identify himself as a member of a political party, and contribute
to a political party or organization.”); NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(A)(1)(f) (2001) (declaring that candidates for election shall not attend
political gatherings unless subject to public election, in which case he or she may
“speak on behalf of his or her own candidacy . . . whether or not at a gathering
sponsored by a political organization;”); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
7(B)(3) (2001) (declaring that judicial candidates may “attend political gatherings
and speak to political gatherings.”). Candidates may also identify themselves as
members of political parties. Canon 7(B)(3)(b)-(c); The OKLAHOMA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not specifically restrain judicial candidates subject
to public election from attending political gatherings; The OREGON CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT JR 4-102(C) (1999) (explaining that candidates cannot publicly
identify themselves as members of a political party “other than by registering to
vote”); PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(2) (2001) (stating
that candidates for election to judicial office should not attend political gatherings
unless he or she is “[a] judge holding an office filled by public election between
competing candidates, or a candidate for such office” in which case he or she may
attend, speak, and identify himself or herself as a member of a political party);
RHODE ISLAND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2001)
(pronouncing that all candidates shall not attend political gatherings unless a nonjudge candidate seeking appointment to judicial office); SOUTH CAROLINA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (proclaiming that candidates shall
not attend political gatherings unless a “non-judge candidate for appointment to
judicial office” or a candidate “subject to public election”); SOUTH DAKOTA CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (forbidding candidates to attend
political gatherings unless a non-judge candidate or subject to public election);
TENNESSEE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(C)(1)(i) (2001) (allowing
candidates to attend political gatherings); TEXAS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(3) (2001) (“A judge or judicial candidate may attend political events and
express his or her views on political matters in accord with this Canon . . . .”);
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(3) (2000) (mandating that
candidates for judicial office already confirmed by the Senate shall not attend
political gatherings). In terms of candidates still subject to selection by the
nominating commission, Utah’s Code provides a blanket statement that those
candidates “shall not engage in political activities that would jeopardize the
confidence of the public or of governmental officials in the political impartiality of
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of the ABA Code. The vast majority of changes states do make to
68
the Model Code concern the political activity of judges.
In 1950, the Minnesota District Judges Association adopted the
69
American Bar Association’s 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics. The
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1974 promulgated a revised code of
70
ethics based largely on the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.
In 1993, the Minnesota Supreme Court established the Minnesota
Supreme Court Advisory Committee to Review the American Bar
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the
Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards to evaluate the 1990 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the Minnesota
71
Board on Judicial Standards.
Among the proposals set forth was a suggested Canon
5(A)(3)(d) that “[r]eplaces [the] previous blanket prohibition
against announcing views on disputed legal or political issues with
[a] prohibition against making statements that commit or appear
to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or

the judicial branch of government” Canon 5(A). Further, those candidates shall
not “seek support or invite opposition to the candidacy because of membership in
a political party.” Canon 5(A)(3); VERMONT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(B)(4)(e) (2000) (forbidding candidates for appointment or confirmation or
retention from engaging in any political activity to obtain the appointment, except
that those candidates may seek support and endorsement from organizations and
if not they are not an incumbent judge, they may participate in political caucuses
and meetings); The CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE STATE OF VIRGINIA,
(2000) do not specify attendance at political gatherings for candidates due to
Virginia’s judicial selection method, however, sitting judges shall not attend such
gatherings, Canon 5(A)(1)(c); WASHINGTON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5(A)(1)(d) (2000) (stating that all candidates shall not attend gatherings of
political organizations unless a non-judge candidate who is appointed or a
candidate subject to public election); WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 5(C)(1)(a) (2001) (allowing candidates to attend political gatherings and
identify themselves as members of a political party); The WISCONSIN CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2001) does not presently specifically limit candidate’s
attendance at political gatherings, but does prohibit judges from participating in
political party affairs, see R. 60.06(2), however, judges may attend a political
meeting as a member of the public but not as a participant, see Commentary to
Rule 60.06(2); WYOMING CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (2000)
(disallowing candidates to attend political gatherings unless a non-judge candidate
for appointment to judicial office or a candidate subject to public election).
68. MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 14.
69. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2001).
70. Id.
71. Final Report, Advisory Committee to Review the American Bar
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the Minnesota
Board on Judicial Standards 1 (1994) [hereinafter “Advisory Committee”].
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72

issues that are likely to come before the court.” The committee
was wary of constitutional issues arising from the current language
and “felt the present Minnesota provision would clearly be
73
challenged.” The committee supported its concerns in the report.
“Code provisions identical to the present Minnesota provision have
been successfully challenged in three of four cases as
74
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.” The three cases cited as
successfully challenging the present provision were American Civil
75
76
Liberties Union, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, J.C.J.D v. R.J.C.R., and
77
Beshear v. Butt with the unsuccessful challenge coming in Stretton v.
78
Disciplinary Board Of Supreme Court Of Pennsylvania. The committee
noted that in Stretton, the court “was forced to adopt a narrow
79
construction” of the provision and that in another case, Buckley v.
80
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, in which the narrow construction was
“expressly stated in the code,” the provision was “struck down as
81
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”
The committee also
documented the fact that the 1990 ABA provision had already
82
survived a constitutional challenge.
Concerning a candidate’s ability to attend political gatherings,
the advisory committee did not follow the 1990 ABA Model Code
language allowing judges or candidates subject to public election to
72. Id. at 2.
73. Id. at 5 n.6.
74. Id.
75. American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, 744 F.Supp. 1094,
1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
76. J.C.J.D v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 953 (Ky. 1991).
77. Beshear v. Butt, 773 F.Supp. 1229, 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991) rev’d on
procedural grounds, No. 91-3426EA, 1992 WL 119188, at *2 (8th Cir. June 4, 1992).
78. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. Of S. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 137 (3rd Cir.
1991).
79. Id. The construction adopted in Stretton was that the canon’s use of
“announcing one’s views” was limited to “situations in which the candidate’s
speech pertains to matters that may come before the court for resolution.” Id. at
143. The court reasoned that the state judicial board had previously adopted the
“narrow construction” position in prior litigation, a narrow construction was
consistent with other provisions of the Judicial Code, and the practice that “every
reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality,” was proper. Therefore, the court was “persuaded that the
broad interpretation of [the canon] urged upon us by plaintiff would be rejected
by the state Supreme Court and that it would adopt the construction advanced by
the Boards here.” Id. at 143-44.
80. Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
81. Advisory Committee, supra note 73.
82. Id. The case cited was Ackerson v. Kentucky Jud. Ret. & Removal Com’n, 776
F.Supp. 309, 309 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
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attend political gatherings and identify themselves as members of
political parties, instead adding to their proposed Canon 5(C) only
those parts of the 1990 Code allowing such candidates to speak to
gatherings on their own behalf, appear in media advertisements to
support their candidacy, and distribute promotional campaign
83
literature.
On February 8, 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered a
hearing, set for April 12, 1995, to consider the advisory committee’s
84
recommendations from its final report. The order allowed those
desiring to submit written statements or make oral presentations to
85
do so.
In response to the court order, Honorable Thomas R. Butler,
Chair of the Advisory Committee, submitted a written report
86
concerning the committee’s recommendations.
In this report,
Judge Butler outlined the following reasons for siding with the
ABA’s language. First, the constitutionality of the present language
was suspect while the proposed language had already been
construed to be constitutional. Second, disciplinary proceedings
would be uncommon because a candidate would, according to the
commentary to Canon 5(A)(3), “emphasize in any public statement
the candidate’s duty to uphold the law regardless of his or her
87
personal views.” Third, the ABA version attempted to “strike the
balance” between the difficulty of prosecution and the need of the
voters to know more about their candidates. Fourth, any statement
that would violate the existing rule would not necessarily be dealt
88
Fifth, in two prior Minnesota cases
with before election day.
involving lawyer candidates violating the existing rule, the lawyers’
83. Advisory Committee, supra note 71 at app. Code of Judicial Conduct
Comparison, at 44.
84. Order for Hearing to Consider Proposed Amendments to the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Rules of the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards
1995.
85. Id.
86. Letter from Hon. Thomas R. Butler, Chair, Advisory Committee to Review
the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of
the Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk of the
Appellate Courts, (April 4, 1995) (on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts,
Minnesota Judicial Center) [hereinafter “Butler Letter”].
87. Advisory Committee, supra note 71 at app. Code of Judicial Conduct
Comparison, at 42.
88. For example, any announcement or statement made immediately before
the general election could “turn the tide of the election and no disciplinary
proceeding could even be commenced before election day has passed.” Butler
Letter, supra note 86, at 11.
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disciplinary board took no action against the candidate. Sixth,
neither the lawyers’ board nor judges’ board had the economic
89
resources to defend the existing language.
Among the other submissions filed was a letter on behalf of
the Minnesota District Judges Association, who “voted to support
the adoption of the recommendations of the Minnesota Supreme
Court Advisory Committee, except for . . . proposed Canon
90
5(A)(3)(d).”
The Minnesota Conference of Chief Judges
“endorsed the recommendations in the report with one exception”
91
which was the proposed Canon 5(A)(3)(d). Similarly, the Court
Rules and Administration Committee of the Minnesota State Bar
Association reviewed the report and at their midyear meetings in
January 1995, the MSBA’s Board of Governors and House of
Delegates voted to support all amendments proposed except
92
Canon 5(A)(3)(d). In that oral report, The MSBA did recognize
the Advisory Committee’s arguments concerning constitutional
issues and prior case law, but sided with the District Judges
Association and the Conference of Chief Judges in recommending
that the supreme court adopt all proposed amendments except
that of Canon 5(A)(3)(d), of which a recommendation was made
that “additional study be undertaken concerning the possible
effects of changing the political speech provisions . . . before such a
93
change is made.”
While judges generally were averse to Canon 5(A)(3)(d), at
least one lawyer urged the adoption by the court of Canon 5.
Attorney Lauren Maker stressed “the side effect of chilling all free
94
speech rights” of the existing Canon 7. She further emphasized
that
[t]he press gives little or no coverage to these races,
89. Butler Letter, supra note 86, at 10-12.
90. Letter from Elizabeth Hayden, President, Minnesota District Judges
Association, to Frederick Grittner, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, (April 6, 1995)
(on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota Judicial Center).
91. Letter from Kevin S. Burke, Chair, Conference of Chief Judges, to
Frederick Grittner, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, (March 17, 1995) (on file with
the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota Judicial Center).
92. Letter from Candice M. Hojan, Court Rules and Administration
Committee, MSBA, to Office of Appellate Courts, (March 31, 1995) (on file with
the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota Judicial Center).
93. Id. at 3.
94. Letter from Lauren K. Maker, Attorney, to the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, (April 7, 1995) (on file with the Clerk of Appellate Courts, Minnesota
Judicial Center).
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because, as one reporter told me, all the candidates can
say is that they are qualified and they will be fair. Even the
League of Women Voters was hesitant to hold a
candidates’ forum for judicial races, because it was
perceived that Canon 7 prevented them from asking
about any issues of substance from the candidates . . . .
The cornerstone to a true democracy is the free exercise
of universal franchise by an educated and informed
95
electorate.
On November 1, 1995, the supreme court ordered the
promulgation of the amendments to the Minnesota Code of
96
The committee’s
Judicial Conduct, effective January 1, 1996.
proposed Canon 5(A)(3)(d) was not adopted.
In September 1997 the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards
petitioned the supreme court to “clarify the nonpartisan nature of
97
judicial elections.”
The supreme court ordered hearings
concerning the Greg Wersal issue, which centered primarily on
98
endorsements and what constituted a political party. The court
99
adopted these recommendations, effective January 1, 1998.
IV. THE DECISION
The Eighth Circuit Court wisely chose strict scrutiny as the
standard of review after much contemplation, but it was not a black
and white decision. The reasons the court used the highest
95. Id. at 1-2.
96. Order of Minnesota Supreme Court, Promulgation of Amendments to
the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules of Board on Judicial Standards
(Nov. 1, 1995)(No. C4-85-697).
97. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2001).
98. Id.
99. Order of the Minnesota Supreme Court Amending Canon 5 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, (Dec. 23, 1997) No. C7-81-300. Comparing the 1998 and
1996 versions of the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(1)(a) in both states
that judges or candidates shall not “act as a leader or hold any office in a political
organization;” with the 1998 version adding, “identify themselves as members of a
political organization, except as necessary to vote in an election.” MINNESOTA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(a) (1998); Canon 5(A)(1)(d) in both
states that judges or candidates shall not “attend political gatherings;” with the
1998 version adding, “or seek, accept or use endorsements from a political
organization.” MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(1)(d) (1998).
Similarly, Canon 5(B)(1)(a) in the 1996 version declared that a judge or
candidate may unless prohibited by law “speak to gatherings on his or her own
behalf.” The present language adopted in 1998 clarifies this as “speak to
gatherings, other than political organization gatherings, on his or her own behalf.”
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(B)(1)(a) (1998).
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possible level of review are crucial and must be remembered
throughout the evaluation of the case.
The standard of review in First Amendment cases is not
100
necessarily strict scrutiny, and the court explained that early. The
court pointed out that while prior cases showed, for example, that
other courts had reviewed contribution limits for non-judicial office
101
under a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, the political speech of
candidates for judicial office is different than that of candidates for
102
legislative or executive office.
The court stated that in the
executive and legislative areas, “the public has a right to know the
details of the programs that candidates propose to enact into law
103
and administer.” However, the “neutral, decision making nature
of the judicial function” separates judges and other governmental
officials and “[t]he judicial candidate simply does not have a First
104
Amendment right to promise to abuse his office.”
From the
State’s perspective, “restrictions on Minnesota judicial candidates’
speech are entirely different from limitations on the speech of
105
candidates for partisan office.”
The court then examined United States Civil Service Commission
106
v. National Association of Letter Carriers, in which the Hatch Act,
prohibiting federal employees from actively participating in
107
political campaigns, was challenged.
There, because the
restrictions imposed did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint,
108
the court used a balancing test less rigorous than strict scrutiny.
Naturally, the defendants in Kelly suggested that lesser standard of
109
However, the court, even though
review was appropriate here.
stating that the balancing test of Letter Carriers would apply to
Wersal as a potential government employee, recognized that Canon

100. Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 862 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997))
(“[r]egulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights must be narrowly
tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger
less exacting review . . .”).
101. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-89 (2000).
102. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 862.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 863.
106. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
107. Id. at 550.
108. Id. at 564.
109. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864.
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110

5 restrained election activity of the candidates themselves.
It
then stated, “[t]he burden on the plaintiff in either case may be
comparable, but the public’s interest in free speech is greater
where the person subject to restrictions is a candidate for public
111
For that
office, about whom the public is obliged to inform itself.”
112
reason, the court invoked strict scrutiny.
Thus, the court applied a critical generality to the overall
picture of this case even before deciding its merits. While the court
seemed to begin its “review” analysis suggesting that the distinction
between the public’s right to know about legislative and judicial
candidates was important enough to require differing standards
with respect to the people’s freedom of speech, that very right of
the public was the deciding factor to applying strict scrutiny when
the free speech restriction was imposed on candidates for public
113
office.
As with all strict scrutiny decisions involving the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the State must first establish
that it has a “compelling reason” for the regulation imposed and
114
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
In terms of the compelling interest of the State of Minnesota,
the court expressed the importance of the independence of the
judiciary and declared, “[t]here is simply no question but that a
judge’s ability to apply the law neutrally is a compelling
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. Indeed, strict scrutiny is recognized as the proper standard of review
in the literature.
Rules that place direct limits on what candidates may say or do in their
campaigns, such as those that commonly appear in codes of judicial
ethics, have been subjected to special scrutiny. In order to justify these
restrictions, courts have often required that the state demonstrate a
“compelling state interest” in its regulation, and that the regulations be
tailored narrowly to the purposes they seek to accomplish.
MCFADDEN, supra note 44 at 70.
113. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864.
114. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 944 F.2d 137, 141-142 (3d
Cir. 1991). “The First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be
demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling
one, and that the restriction operates without unnecessarily circumscribing
protected expression.” Id. (stating that the two facets to the analysis of a First
Amendment infringement case implicating a restriction on political speech). The
test has also been described, as it is in this case, as the State having to “show that
the “regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198
(1992).
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115

governmental interest of the highest order.”
The question is,
what is truly meant by the term “independent?” It appears there
are two possibilities that require further exploration. Either
independence means literally free from all external (and
consequently personal internal) influences, or it means free from
the appearance of dependence on those influences.
If the former, does the State genuinely have an interest in
completely independent judges, that is, judges who decide cases
with no preconceived notions, no preformed thoughts, no
subjective ideas or personal principles from which to draw? Are
they to decide cases within a moral vacuum? Being impartial is
uncontroversial in the context of freedom from personal bias for or
against litigants in that judge’s court, but becomes controversial if
judges are required to “avoid the influence of their own moral,
116
social or political views in their decision making.”
The court,
quoting Stretton, further stated that
[i]n those [executive and legislative] areas, the public has
the right to know the details of the programs that
candidates propose to enact into law and administer.
Pledges to follow certain paths are not only expected, but
are desirable so that voters may make a choice between
proposed agendas that affect the public. By contrast, the
judicial system is based on the concept of individualized
decisions on challenged conduct and interpretations of
117
law enacted by the other branches of government.
The fact of the matter is that interpretation of law naturally has
to include one’s own viewpoint, regardless of the historical record
or documentation available. If the plain language of the law is
clear, no judicial determination is needed. The problem is that the
more complex the issue, the more convoluted the particular law,
the more nebulous the supporting documentation, then the more
necessary it is that a judge will use his or her inherent value system.
Voters need to be fully aware of this vital concept so that they can
accurately and soundly “make a choice between proposed agendas
118
that affect the public.”
In fact, the increasing concern of what
many refer to as judicial activism makes it imperative that voters
119
know a judge’s value system.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Kelly, 247 F.3d at 864.
MCFADDEN, supra note 44, at 71.
Kelly, 247 F.3d at 862.
Id.
Judicial activism is the “philosophy . . . whereby judges allow their
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The court further declared that even though the methods of
judicial selection among the states and of the federal system are
varied, the “explicit or implicit” goal in either is to maintain “an
independent judiciary as free from political, economic and social
pressure as possible so judges can decide cases without those
120
influences.”
Of course, even though the federal system of
appointment is different than Minnesota’s electoral system, no one
can doubt the importance to many Americans of the political
affiliation of the President of the United States when a Supreme
121
Court vacancy arises.
“Those who claim switching to an
appointed judicial system would remove politics from the courts
are naïve . . . . In reality . . . there may be only a handful of judges
who earned their appointments based solely on merit and not on
122
partisanship.”
In recent years, the selection of Supreme Court justices has
been a most heated and political battle. Concerning the conflict
with Supreme Court nominee Robert H. Bork, “[u]nlike the Fortas,
Haynsworth, and Carsell cases, where much of the Senate debate
focused on non-ideological considerations such as ethics and
competence, the deliberations on Bork centered on the nominee’s
123
ideology.”
Will current and future federal appointment battles
personal views about public policy . . . to guide their decisions, usually with the
suggestion that adherents . . . are willing to ignore precedent.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 850 (7th ed. 1999). Of course, judicial activism can work both a
conservative and liberal bias, whether the subject is abortion rights or child
visitation. See Thomas L. Jipping, If Judicial Activism Is the Means, the End Is Not
Justified,
at
(June
19,
2000),
see
http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0600judicialactivism.htm;
also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MINNESOTA, CHOOSING MINNESOTA’S JUDGES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 11 (1998)
[hereinafter “LEAGUE”] (“If judges are perceived to be ideological activists who
make policy, rather than independent and dispassionate appliers of the law, then
it follows that judges should not be insulated from politics, but that they should be
publicly accountable for their rulings.”).
120. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 865.
121. William E. Hulbary & Thomas G. Walker, The Supreme Court Selection
Process: Presidential Motivations and Judicial Performance, 33 W. POL. Q. 185, 189
(1980). In an examination of presidential motivations in judicial selection,
William Hulbary and Thomas Walker concluded that approximately 93 percent of
the eighty-four Supreme Court justices studied “reached the Court in part because
the Chief Executive desired a nominee of a particular philosophical bent.”
122. BOUTROS, supra note 43, at 40.
123. JOHN MASSARO, SUPREMELY POLITICAL 159 (1990). In what amounts to an
undeniable truth, WASHINGTON POST columnist David Broder wrote, concerning
the Bork nomination, “[i]t should offend no one that the battle has this intensely
political coloration. The pope’s visit reminds us that even those who have a higher
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be fought so that in the end each side is content with the fact that a
completely neutral federal judge has been chosen? Of course not.
Each side’s goal is to select a judge who, though fair and impartial,
has an underlying value system that more or less represents that
side’s views and will be used to interpret existing laws.
Maybe the state’s interest is only in the perception of
independence from the public’s point of view, regardless of an
individual judge’s true posture? But not being able to express
one’s views does not imply those views don’t exist. “You have not
124
converted a man because you have silenced him.”
Judges and
judicial candidates aren’t nonpartisan simply because they can’t
125
Akin to the
talk politics, but that is not always seen as the case.
“Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People” mantra, words don’t
make a partisan judge, a partisan judge makes a partisan judge.
The bottom line is that a false appearance with no underlying truth
can only harm the judiciary and the voters.
In reality, it appears the majority opinion concurred with both
ideas. Quoting Letter Carriers, “it is not only important that the
Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political
justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be
126
avoiding it.”
Additionally, “[t]he state’s interest in ensuring that
judges be and appear to be neither antagonistic nor beholden to any
127
interest, party, or person is entitled to the greatest respect.”
But as discussed, given human nature, the idea of a sterile
calling are chosen through a political mechanism.” Id. at 168 (citing David
Broder, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1987, at D7). Further, Terri Jennings Peretti,
Professor of Political Science at Santa Clara University, argues in her book, IN
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT, that
[p]olicy motivation, particularly in the form of value-voting serves as the
primary vehicle by which the [Supreme] Court performs an important
representation function. Representation occurs when the justices decide
in accordance with their political views, which have been consciously and
deliberately sanctioned by elected officials competing for political
control of the Court through the selection process. Rather than acting
arbitrarily, the justices are merely carrying out the “policy premises” of
their appointments.
TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 84 (1999).
124. JOHN MORLEY, ON COMPROMISE ch. 5 (1874).
125. For example, one writer remarks, “While there is no reason unnecessarily
to stifle interesting discussion in the context of judicial elections, the law must not
allow speech that compromises the impartiality of the candidate.” Neil K. Sethi,
The Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed Constitutional Speech Restriction for Judicial
Selection, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 728 (1997).
126. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867.
127. Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
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judicial world is impossible. To be completely nonpolitical is to be
without thought and devoid of values. The fallacy of the current
system is that voters are not clamoring for “don’t ask, don’t tell”
treatment from their judiciary or the State. The choice by the
people to hold judicial elections, even nonpartisan ones, is the
same choice to bring to the table candidates of varying viewpoints.
And yes, some of those viewpoints may be political. “Where the
people are to rule through elections, such elections must respect
the power of the people, not fear of popular incompetence or
128
special interests.”
It is and can never be bad to know what the
person you vote for might do in any given situation, because it
provides direct accountability to the voter. Why have an election absent
this accountability?
The dissent captured this sentiment in its view of what the
people of Minnesota historically adopted as their policy on the
129
judiciary. In Moon v. Halverson, a Minnesota case from 1939, the
issue surrounded 1912 election law legislation that placed, among
other candidates, all supreme court justice and elective county
130
officer names on a nonpartisan ballot.
The statute further
disallowed party designations on the ballot and no candidate filing
for nomination on the ballot could state his party affiliation, a
131
move to increase the selection of judges based on merit.
Halverson allegedly let it be known in public he was basically a
132
The Moon court stated that two
Farmer-Labor candidate.
constructions of the statute were available; either a candidate could
not state his party affiliation at any time throughout the election
process, or the statute merely referenced filing for nomination and

128. Brief of Amicus Curiae, The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union at 4-5,
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4021)
[hereinafter “MCLU Brief”]. Further,
[s]ince then, Minnesota voters have had the opportunity several times to
adopt the “conservative,” “holding back waves of popular excitement”
Hamiltonian approach to judicial selection. Minnesota voters have not
chosen to make the change and adopt the federal system. They have left
the people with an important voice in the selection of judges.
Id. at 10.
129. Moon v. Halverson, 206 Minn. 331, 288 N.W. 579 (1939).
130. Id. at 580.
131. Id.
132. Id. In 1944, the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party merged with the
Minnesota Democratic Party to form the present DFL. Historical information
available
at
about
the
Farmer-Labor
Party,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/articlesnew/04374.html.
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133

ballot content.
“We think the latter more practical and
134
reasonable in light of our elective system of government.”
Further, “[t]he statute does not prohibit party activity or
135
endorsements.”
Clearly, the court could have made the case for
an extension of this limitation to further political activity as a
reasonable interpretation of the statute. Noteworthy is not only the
Moon court’s inferred reaffirmation of the importance of
information to the electorate and the ability of a candidate to allow
political information to reach the voters, but the fact that the
court’s initial decision, as stated, was in truth a value judgment.
The dissent further emphasized the history of Minnesota
policy towards its judiciary and if, in fact, independent judicial
elections are within that policy interest. “Minnesota has repeatedly
affirmed its citizens’ right to elect their judges, and has bolstered
that franchise with laws enhancing merit-based elections and
furthering the flow of information regarding the candidates to the
136
electorate.” It is this flow of information which allows citizens to
elect judges based on their merits, which include not only
“character, fitness, integrity, background (with the exception of
their political affiliation), education, legal experience, work habits
and abilities,” but other qualities as well, qualities that “piqued the
interest” of Minnesota’s founders as well as those wishing to be fully
informed about a candidate before sending him or her to the
137
bench to interpret the law.
Indeed the dissent astutely read the
context of an independent judiciary to take into account not
merely the right of the candidate to inform, but the criticality of
the people to be informed when selecting justices to serve. This
entitlement of information to the citizenry is a sentiment that is not
only inherent in the dissent’s opinion, but also, as discussed, was
vital to the majority opinion in its decision to apply strict scrutiny as
the standard of review.
The idea is this: An independent judiciary means judges who
138
are “elected by well-informed, independent voters.” In effect, any
policy that stifles the free flow of information undermines the
133. Moon, 206 Minn. at 333, 288 N.W. at 581.
134. Id.
135. Id. It is also interesting and insightful that the Moon court in this instance
regarded emphasis on the candidate’s merits “irrespective of his party
membership or association” as a “Utopia.” Id. at 580.
136. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 890.
137. Id.
138. Id. at n.30.
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139

judicial selection process. Where this will come into play may not
necessarily be with Minnesota’s interest in having an independent
judiciary, which may indeed be compelling, but with the scope of
what Minnesota has done with this decision. To have an
independent judiciary, the voters need to be fully informed so,
rather than electing partisan judges that they don’t know are
partisan, they can elect independent candidates. The decision
becomes a two way street. Is it more important to keep information
from voters about a candidate’s views on disputed legal or political
issues in order to minimize the chance that a partisan judge will be
elected based on a populist appeal? Or is it just as important that
voters know about a candidate’s views on these issues so that a
partisan judge is not elected? The whole concept of an election is
voter choice, and voter choice equates with voter information. The
State of Minnesota has already chosen to give its citizens decisionmaking power and has accepted the risk that “the people may be
swayed one way or another by appeals and artifices of political
140
campaigning.”
Indeed, the dissent pointed out from Eu v. San Francisco County
141
Democratic Central Committee that “[a] State’s claim that it is
enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by
restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with
142
some skepticism.”
While the facts of Eu involved legislative
positions, the fundamental truth of that proclamation holds for any
process where the people make an elective choice.
Another area of dispute in this case was that of judicial
political pressure. “[A] State has an interest in protecting its judges
143
from pressure to participate in partisan activities . . . .”
In the
present case it certainly cannot be that the State is concerned that
any judge would truly be beholden to the values or platform of a
political party. If that were true, the public would be putting a
much higher demand on its judiciary than on its elected legislative
officials, from which expectations in this regard have not
traditionally been high. It is not shocking that elected officials
have and will continue to break campaign promises, only to be

139.
140.
141.
(1989).
142.
143.

Id.
MCLU Brief, supra note 128, at 11.
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 214
Id. at 228.
Kelly, 247 F.3d at 867.
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reelected again. But more importantly in the context of judicial
candidates, could it be reasonably perceived that announcing one’s
views on disputed legal or political issues is akin to a campaign
promise? If Minnesota’s goal is to keep the judiciary independent
from political influences in the sense that, even if an individual
judge leans toward one political philosophy more than another, the
State wants that judge to be able to “cross over” without feeling any
political ramifications, the importance of the electorate to know
from what side the judge leans is still too important to keep hidden
from the people.
The majority opinion continued to pursue the idea that judges
will bind themselves to particular positions and decide cases in a
particular manner solely because the judge has announced his or
her view. “The judicial candidate simply does not have a First
144
Amendment right to promise to abuse his office.” As the dissent
stressed, this proves too much, and not only because the Supreme
Court has said, “the State may ban such illegal agreements [to
engage in illegal conduct] without trenching on any right of
association protected by the First Amendment,” and that “[t]he fact
such an agreement takes the form of words does not confer upon
it . . . the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment
145
extends to speech.”
The majority opinion seemed to convey the
feeling with those “abuse” words that the announce clause of
Canon 5 is the only thing standing between judicial independence
and substantial impropriety. But a judge has no further right to
abuse his office just because he has leaped the election hurdle.
Canon 2 of the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct is entitled A
Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of
the Judge’s Activities, within which Canon 2(B) states, “A judge shall
not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence
146
judicial conduct or judgment.”
Moreover, Canon 3(A)(2)
declares, “[the judge] shall be unswayed by partisan interests,
147
public clamor or fear of criticism.” Of course, the legislature has
also created and given the Minnesota Board on Judicial Standards
the power to “censure or remove a judge for . . . conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial
144.
145.
146.
added).
147.

Id. at 862.
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982).
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2000) (emphasis
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(A)(2) (2000).
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148

office into disrepute.”
Similarly, in its analysis of whether Canon 5 was “necessary,”
the court confused the idea of announcing one’s views on disputed
legal or political issues with making “particularized pledges and
predetermined commitments that mark campaigns for legislative
149
and executive office.”
That comparison is mere fallacy. The
contention is that a candidate’s message will attract a certain
number of voters for the wrong reasons. However, the flip side of
this assertion is equally plausible, that a judicial candidate’s stance
will not always curry positive favor with the voters. Ideally, voters
vote for or against incumbents based on a careful study of their past
decisions and for challengers based on their views of disputed legal
150
or political issues, in the context of a judicial philosophy.
Certainly, a candidate’s views of the legal and political issues will
turn off a substantial number of voters, and in all likelihood the net
benefit will be zero to the candidate. The voters as a whole,
however, will have taken a major victory in terms of candidate
information.
The vast majority of voters are not looking for commitments,
they are looking for views. In the case at bar, Mr. Wersal, at
multiple Republican Party gatherings, said he favored “strict
151
construction of the Constitution.”
Strict constructionism is
“[t]he doctrinal view . . . holding that judges should interpret a
document or statute . . . according to its literal terms, without
152
looking to other sources to ascertain the meaning.”
A disputed
legal issue? Of course. Moreover, a candidate who promotes the
fact he or she is a strict constructionist does no more than advocate
a position undoubtedly held by a fair number of practicing judges.
Certainly a position Minnesota voters would like to know as they
cast their ballots. In the case of strict constructionism, it would be
impossible to prejudge a case because strict constructionism is a
method of interpretation, not final adjudication. Have all strict
148. MINN. STAT. § 490.16 (2000).
149. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 877.
150. The majority opinion states, “We further believe the Minnesota Supreme
Court would conclude that general discussions of case law or a candidate’s judicial
philosophy do not fall within the scope of the announce clause.” Kelly, 247 F.3d at
882. The court says this, however, in the context of Stretton and the district court’s
“issues that would likely come before them.” As Judge Posner points out in
Buckley, what issue is likely not to come before the court? Buckley v. Illinois
Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993).
151. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 858.
152. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (7th ed. 1999).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2002], Art. 3
09_NELSON

1640

4/22/2002 10:24 AM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

constructionists currently on the bench prejudged their cases? A
well informed public can only be appreciative of the fact a judge
will decide different cases with different facts based on a core set of
values. That is exactly what the electorate is looking for.
The majority opinion looked at recent Minnesota cases for
additional support during its “necessary” analysis. In Peterson v.
153
Stafford, the court stated that the judicial office “requires its
holder studiously to avoid partisan politics, refrain from all
discussions of public issues and restrict one’s membership and
participation in organizations to those primarily of a professional
154
This too goes far beyond reasonable expectations. Just
nature.”
as announcing one’s views on disputed issues will not necessarily
lead to abuse of power, announcing one’s views also does not lead
to partisan loyalty to an entire platform. In fact, what does an
“independent” voter proclaim of him- or herself? Not that he or
she has no views on any issues, but that he or she is not necessarily
loyal to the views of one party. If the concern is attendance at
political gatherings, many registered party members likewise do not
fall in step with their party on every issue.
Former Governor Arne Carlson, during the supreme court’s
consideration and approval process of the amendments to Canon
5, said, “[f]or the public to read newspaper headlines that a
political party has endorsed and will work to elect a particular
candidate would greatly harm the public’s confidence in the
155
independence of the judiciary.”
But isn’t there greater harm in
the candidate in fact harboring partisan feelings of which the voter
knows and can know nothing? If a particular partisan candidate
wanted to deceptively “play” independent as an election strategy,
he could hide behind Canon 5, citing it as the reason he “can’t
answer that question.”
Further evidence of what is really a disrespect for the voter’s
156
right to know can be found in Gustafson v. Holm, a case the
Stretton court cited and from which reasoning was borrowed and
repeated in the present case. In Gustafson, the relevant issue was
157
the use of the word “incumbent” on the ballot.
Use of the word ‘incumbent’ following the candidate’s
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 425 (1992).
Id. at 425.
Kelly, 247 F.3d at 870.
232 Minn. 118, 44 N.W.2d 443 (1950).
Id. 232 Minn. at 126-127, 44 N.W.2d at 447.
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name simply informs the voter of the person who
presently holds the position. In assisting voters to cast
their votes intelligently for offices unfamiliar to the
average voter, it is only a matter of fairness that he be
advised who the present judge is. If he then believes that
the judge should be retained, he has the opportunity of
expressing his opinion by his vote. If he feels that the
present judge should be replaced, he has a like
opportunity of so indicating his opinion. The underlying
purpose of the legislation is to identify the candidate so
158
that the voter will know whom he is voting for.
Two issues are notable here. First, evidently the voter is to feel (or
be?) fully informed and encouraged to cast a vote, regardless of his
or her knowledge of the candidate, solely on the candidate’s
incumbent status. Second, the label “incumbent” is apparently a
satisfactory tag to identify a judicial candidate, but party affiliation
must not enter the voter’s thought process. How is it any better to
vote straight “incumbent” rather than straight Republican when the
stated purpose of the legislation requiring this is to inform the
voter? Granted, in 1950 the Minnesota District Judges Association
had adopted the American Bar Association’s 1924 Canons of
Judicial Ethics, but as discussed, the bar on political speech and
announcing one’s views was relatively low. At least voters have a
“gut feeling” based on party affiliation; incumbent status by itself is
empty of relevant information.
Throughout this analysis, the court relied heavily on and
borrowed much reasoning from Stretton, in which the announce
159
clause was challenged.
In Stretton, the plaintiff was a lawyer and
candidate for the Court of Common Pleas in Chester County,
Pennsylvania, who brought suit contending the announce clause
160
impeded his ability to campaign. The announce clause was given
a narrow construction and “limited to situations in which the
candidate’s speech pertains to matters that may come before the
161
court for resolution,” which narrowly tailored the provision to
162
serve Pennsylvania’s compelling interest in an impartial judiciary.
In Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, a mid-court judge was

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 139.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
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running for a seat on the Supreme Court of Illinois.
During his
campaign, the judge circulated campaign literature stating he had
164
Two
“never written an opinion reversing a rape conviction.”
weeks from the election, the Judicial Inquiry Board filed charges
165
Judge Posner, in his analysis of the announce
against him.
166
clause, stated, “the only safe response to [the rule] is silence.”
Further, “when an overinclusive rule has the effect . . . of greatly
curtailing an important part of the speech ‘market,’ the rule is
167
deeply problematic.”
In response to the district judge’s
narrowing of the rule to confine it to “issues likely to come before
the judge in his judicial capacity,” Judge Posner said, “[t]here is
almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a
judge of an American court, state or federal, of general
168
More to the point, the broad construction of the
jurisdiction.”
announce clause has been found unconstitutional every single time
it has been challenged. Even when narrowed, it has not passed
169
muster.
The compelling interest put forth by the majority is laudable
and the independence of the judiciary is of extreme importance.
But the stakes are higher when the subject is the heart of our
democratic process: election speech and association. And this bar
remains that high even though the subject is a judicial, not
legislative or executive, candidate. Evidence of the cap on the
judiciary’s independence from the First Amendment is given in the
170
dissent’s citation to Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.
Neither the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting the
reputation of its judges, nor its interest in maintaining the
institutional integrity of its courts is sufficient to justify the
subsequent punishment of speech at issue here . . . . The
remaining interest sought to be protected, the institutional
reputation of the courts, is entitled to no greater weight in the
171
constitutional scales.
The dissent further pointed out that while the basis for sanctions
163. Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 225 (7th Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 226.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 228.
167. Id. at 229.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 231.
170. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
171. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 898 (Beam, J. dissenting) (quoting Landmark
Communications, 435 U.S. at 839, 841-42).
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may be different between Landmark and the case at bar, the severity
of the Canon 5 restrictions to a judicial candidate “pose a much
172
greater danger.”
In terms of attendance at political gatherings, the inability of
Minnesota judicial candidates to attend political gatherings is in
even starker contrast to most states that have public judicial
173
elections.
The necessity of a prohibition that as its purpose is to
curtail a look of impropriety suffers from the same fundamental
problem as the announce clause. That is, attendance at an event
certainly does not guarantee or even predict that a candidate will
blindly follow the tenets of that party, something brought up by the
174
dissent.
But more importantly, if the goal is to disallow all
attendance at truly “political gatherings,” the provision allows
attendance at gatherings that can be far more political than
175
Republican or Democrat. One of the most important points the
dissent made about this is that while varied ideas abound at both
Republican and Democratic functions because of the “big-tent”
nature of those parties, single issue organizations have obviously a
small focus that may be counted on by that organization’s members
176
to be upheld by the candidate should he or she get elected.
Further, since a candidate is running for election, he or she
needs votes. Attendance, not necessarily even speech, at a political
party gathering is just another way to get in touch with more voters.
“Candidates speak at political gatherings about their work
experience, family life, community activities, family history and
other facts about their lives which indicate what kind of person they
177
are.”
A particular example is that of former judicial candidate
Bruce A. Peterson, who spoke to the Republican Party of Minnesota
172. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 898 n.40.
173. See generally, supra note 67.
174. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 900 (Beam, J. dissenting).
175. It is noteworthy that the actual language used in Canon 5(A)(1)(d) is
“shall not . . . attend political gatherings” while the language regarding holding
office in, identifying oneself as a member of, making speeches on behalf of and
other clauses of Canon 5 refer to “political organizations.” It is the term “political
organization” of Canon 5(D) that is defined as a political party organization.
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2000). Therefore, it is possible
that the term “political gathering” of Canon 5(A)(1)(d) could be construed as any
gathering with a political message. However, that is not the convention used in
this case, and in fact, the dissent refers to Canon 5(A)(1)(d) as attending “political
organization gatherings.” Kelly, 247 F.3d at 900 (Beam, J. dissenting).
176. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 901 (Beam, J. dissenting).
177. Appellant’s Brief at 20, Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly, 247 F.3d
854 (8th Cir. 2001) No. 99-4021.
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during the 1996 campaign, saying
[d]uring the campaign . . . I spoke at an equal number of
Republican and DFL gatherings . . . . These meetings
were some of the high points of the campaign. The
audiences were knowledgeable and interested, . . . the
people present seemed likely to share their opinions with
their friends and neighbors. I never mentioned my party
178
affiliation, nor did I ask for an endorsement.
Consequently, attendance at a smaller single focus group with
proportionately fewer potential voters might suggest that particular
candidate may be more in tune with that single issue. However,
consistency demands that even attendance at a minor single-issue
political gathering does not mean that a candidate conforms to
those views.
The right to associate is “a right to join with others to pursue
179
goals independently protected by the First Amendment.”
There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to
associate with others for the common advancement of
political beliefs and ideas is a form of ‘orderly group
activity’ protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments . . . . The right to associate with the political
party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic
180
constitutional freedom.
The danger here lies in the implied connection between the
candidate and the “advancement of political beliefs,” presumably
those of the candidate. However, again, even though the right
exists because the pursuit is protected, that does not mean that all
individuals joined adhere fully to all beliefs of that organization.
The thrust of Equal Protection is that similarly situated people
must be treated similarly. The majority opinion accurately stated
that “[t]o conclude that the same restraints [of Canon 5] violate
the Equal Protection Clause, we would have to determine that
Canon 5 burdens the rights of political party members more than
181
others and that ‘such differential treatment is not justified.’” To
explore this, it is necessary to determine what rights other
organizations would have that political parties lose because Canon
5 forbids candidates to attend their political gatherings. Simply
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1013 (2nd ed. 1988).
180. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976).
181. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 875 (quoting California Med. Ass’n v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 200 (1981)).
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put, it centers on the right of the political organization to express
182
The majority opinion cited Broadrick v.
itself as it chooses.
Oklahoma, a case involving a restriction on partisan activities by
government employees, as stating that legislatures must have some
flexibility in determining which employment positions require
183
restrictions on political activity and which do not. This footnoted
citation within Broadrick referenced another case, McGowan v.
184
Maryland
as clearly supporting the proposition. However,
McGowan was a case involving the sale of merchandise on Sunday, a
violation of Maryland statute, but more significantly it was an
economic regulation, in which a rational basis standard of review,
not strict scrutiny, was involved. The court in the case at bar did
not independently address the burdening of the rights of political
party members in this regard.
Further, such differential treatment is not justified. The
majority opinion, regarding political parties, stated, “[t]hose
parties are simply in a better position than other organizations to
hold a candidate in thrall. Moreover, because political parties have
comprehensive platforms, obligation to a party has a great
likelihood of compromising a judge’s independence on a wide
185
array of issues.” This is simply not true. As alluded to above, the
extensive scope of issues any political party holds as their own is the
very thing decreasing the likelihood that a judge will be beholden
to an entire party. There are simply too many variations within the
members of any one political party. “A candidate’s appearance at a
party function hardly indicates endorsement of its views. A speech
at a party function supports nothing beyond the candidate’s own
words, and an endorsement suggests only that the endorser finds a
186
candidate more palatable than any other presently available.”
The majority goes on to declare that Canon 4 imposes broad
requirements that judges are to avoid involvement with associations
(other than political parties) to avoid casting doubt on their
187
impartiality.
But the Canons as a whole impose those
requirements on all judicial activities. In other words, anything the
Canons impose on a judge regarding associations in general could

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 895 (Beam, J. dissenting).
Id. at 875 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607 n. 5 (1973)).
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Kelly, 247 F.3d at 876.
Id. at 901 (Beam, J. dissenting).
Id. at 876.
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be applied to his or her association with political parties as well,
rendering unnecessary a distinct restriction concerning political
parties.
The dissent’s opinion regarding single-issue organizations was
again on point. As discussed, the risk that organizations that have a
central issue focus will hold a candidate’s feet to the fire is far
greater than if the organization is one of broad expanse. As the
dissent illustrated, these smaller groups are not necessarily distinct
188
from the political or legal process. “This country is also seeing a
marked increase in special interest politics, which brings out highly
organized groups who are motivated to defeat or elect a judge
according to his or her position (presumed known) on single issues
189
such as abortion, term limits, the death penalty, or guns.”
The
majority comments that this dissenting argument is in fact a call for
190
But the obviousness of this
more, rather than less, restriction.
problem on both ends suggests that the supreme court is not
addressing the core of the problem. “By removing the only
organizations that endorse candidates across a spectrum of issues,
voters are left with only the shrill voice of narrow advocacy coming
191
from special interest groups.”
Admittedly, if the goal is to eliminate the appearance of
judicial bias, from a narrowly tailored/necessary point of view, the
underinclusive nature of the prohibition on attendance at political
gatherings is likely not a constitutional problem and in fact
192
underinclusiveness is rarely invalidated by the court.
However,
the compelling interest of the State must take a backseat to the
fundamental rights that interest is curtailing.
The judicial
candidate’s right of expression cannot be trumped solely because
one of the three branches of government is deemed by the State to
be “more equal” than the other two. “In . . . inviting a candidate to
speak, a party ‘reflects its members’ views about the philosophical
and governmental matters that bind them together [and] seeks to

188. Id. at 901 (Beam, J. dissenting). The dissenting opinion mentions groups
active in recent judicial elections: The League of Women Voters, People for
Responsible Government, Minnesota Women Lawyers, and Lavender Magazine,
among others. Id.
189. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 10. (“These groups, whose interests are clearly
focused, increasingly are targeting judicial campaigns as a relatively inexpensive
way to influence public policy.”). Id.
190. Id. at 872 n.17.
191. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 902 (Beam, J. dissenting).
192. TRIBE, supra note 179, at 1440 n.4.
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convince others to join those members in a practical democratic
193
task,’ an election.” The entire election process and all its players
benefit by the free flow of information; candidates, parties, and
voters.
Much has been written about the judicial selection system,
both locally and nationally. The term “incumbent protection” has
been thrown about, reflecting the apparent advantage incumbents
194
have to reelection. For example, in the 2000 Minnesota General
195
Election, all ten of the incumbent judges up for reelection won.
Reasons given for this advantage include lawyers who don’t want to
run against sitting judges before whom they may be practicing and
196
the listing of “incumbent” on ballots. Of course, the issue in the
197
case at bar has some bearing as well.
The election system itself has come under question, in the
form of the virtue of nonpartisan versus partisan elections.
“[B]ecause the party voting cue is not available in nonpartisan
elections, even more voters are relegated to basing their vote on
irrelevant factors, such as ballot position and name. Because of
these factors, incumbents overwhelmingly win re-election,
198
regardless of ability.” Some suggestions for improving the system
199
include an active role for the media to inform voters.
But in at
least one large metro area of Minnesota, this will not likely result in
an impartial, objective source of information for voters who
200
indulge in print media.
While there is nothing wrong with the
193. Kelly, 247 F.3d at 893 (Beam, J. dissenting) (quoting Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 615 (1996)).
194. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 10.
195. Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, 2000 – Minnesota General
at
Election,
Judicial
Results
(2000),
http://elections.sos.state.mn.us/ENR2000_General/ElecRslts.asp?M=J&P=A (last
modified Dec. 12, 2000).
196. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 10.
197. “With challengers unable to create traction by discussing actual issues . . .
the results in judicial elections are hardly surprising.” Kelly, 247 F.3d at 896
(Beam, J. dissenting).
198. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One ‘Best’
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995).
199. LEAGUE, supra note 119, at 18-19.
200. For example, a review of the editorial endorsements of the Minneapolis
Star Tribune from election years 1988 through 2000 reveals the tilt these
endorsements have taken. The following results are listed in order of Democrat,
Republican, and Independent (if present) candidate percentages taken as a whole
from that 12 year time period: U.S. President, 100-0; U.S House, 73-25-2; U.S.
Senate, 75-25; Governor, 33-67; Minnesota Legislature, 70-29-1. The results are on
file with author. The extremely partisan commentary within these endorsements
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editors of a newspaper supporting a philosophy on their editorial
page, the electorate must be aware of that philosophy when
attempting to acquire information through those very editorials.
The lesson indeed may be that politics, at its base merely a
marketplace of ideas, is inherent in everything around us, from an
independent judiciary, to a news source attempting to educate us
on that judiciary. But just as the reader must know from what
context he is reading, the voter must know for what principles he
or she is voting.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the current debate over Minnesota’s choice of
judicial selection, Minnesota’s founders chose a system whereby the
citizens elect their judges. To vote effectively, the people must be
allowed to examine factors they feel are critical to determining
judicial ability. Factors that may be above and beyond what the
Minnesota Supreme Court thinks are necessary or important. By
allowing Canon 5 to extinguish these rights, the Eighth Circuit’s
inconsistent decision only serves to cement the status of incumbent
judges, weaken their challengers, and thwart the ability of the
citizens to place within the judiciary people who share their values.

is typified with remarks such as those against the Republican challenger of
Kathleen Sekhon, the Star Tribune’s endorsee. “Those ideas – cutting taxes,
restricting abortion, relaxing laws against carrying concealed weapons – won’t
contribute much to bettering life in Minnesota.” Editorial, MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct.
27, 1998, at A13.
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